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Viewing cable 08KABUL346, AFGHAN VIEWS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND OSLO PROCESS

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08KABUL346**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08KABUL346	2008-02-12 12:04	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Kabul

Appears in these articles:

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VZCZCXRO5849
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 00346

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STATE FOR PM/WRA (KATHERINE AKER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2018

TAGS: [MPS](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [AF](#)

SUBJECT: AFGHAN VIEWS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND OSLO PROCESS

REF: A. 0 STATE 167308

[1](#)B. STATE 13607

Classified By: Ambassador Wood for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Wood on January 31 raised the cluster munitions (CM) issue with President Karzai and National Security Advisor Rassoul, who said the Afghan government would not take any steps that would damage the U.S.-Afghan security relationship. Foreign Minister Spanta told the Ambassador and Assistant Secretary Boucher on February 8 that although an Afghan representative would attend the Wellington meeting on CM, the Afghan government would not sign any document produced by the "Oslo Process."

12. (C) Following up on Embassy demarches to the MOD and MFA in December (Ref C), Ambassador Wood discussed the Oslo Process with Karzai and Rassoul on January 31. Karzai and Rassoul understood the significance of the issue for the U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership and promised that the Afghan Government would not sign an Oslo Process treaty.

13. (C) Following Spanta's return on February 7 from extended travel, he informed Ambassador Wood that the participation by an Afghan representative at Oslo Process meetings was a mistaken initiative by the Afghan Ambassador to Norway. MFA officials at the Assistant Secretary level had apparently viewed the cluster munitions issue in the same vein as the anti-landmine Ottawa Treaty, to which Afghanistan is a party. The MFA bureaucracy saw an opportunity to further insert Afghanistan into the anti-landmine (inclusive of ordnance resulting in explosive remnants of war) group of nations in the international community without regard for the implications for the U.S.-Afghan relationship. When the issue reached the Foreign Minister's office, the Minister's Senior Advisor provided informal assurances that Afghanistan would not be a signatory to an Oslo Process treaty, which Spanta formally confirmed on February 7.

14. (C) COMMENT: The delay in receiving a formal response from the MFA and the necessity of raising this issue with the President underscore the dearth of experienced diplomats in the MFA. It also underscores the narrow focus of the MOD, which was unaware of Afghan participation in Oslo Process meetings and the implications for U.S.-Afghan security relations. Although Embassy encouraged the MOD to insert itself into the decision-making process, considering the military interoperability and training assistance equities, Defense Minister Wardak was reluctant to engage on a "diplomatic" matter unless/until brought up in cabinet meetings.

WOOD